Tuesday, June 23, 2015

On Rejecting Amor Fati and “All things necessary” - Something to tide you over 'til I get Hume done

Good coming after bad does not justify the bad and does not necessarily mean whatsoever that bad had to happen for good to happen.  All things (asides from perhaps the Big Bang) requires causal temporal and material relations from the past, yes, but it does not logically follow from that that all things past were influential and therefore required, and therefore morally acceptable (as Nietzsche claims) to have all the things in life that should be valued to occur.  This is a “copout” to me. Perhaps one of the greatest of all – right on par with Christian notions of all things being good in God’s eyes, or being morally justified through being part of a Divine Plan which Nietzsche might scoff at.  It says we cannot and more-so should not try to do anything fundamental in changing the world for the better. Instead, not only do we throw our hands up and say “can’t do anything” along the lines of a type of Primitivism it proclaims we fundamentally shouldn’t do anything.  We can make progress yes, but this is not an alteration of “fate” but acting according to it for both the Christian and Nietzsche with his notion of Will to Power.
Utilitarianism says something radically different. It says there is “good” and “bad” and therefore “right” and “wrong” – though as determined beings (and this Nietzsche would agree with) we should not be deemed as fundamentally “evil” when we do wrong, we shouldn’t have fundamental blame placed on us in the sense those who believe in free will would.  It says that all in the past was not required for the present, and all that is now is not required for what the future will bring. There are significant facts and insignificant ones.  And there are traits of reality that according to physical law will create good states for organic or synthetic (artificial) systems and bad states for them according to at-times the exact same variables only slightly altered.  It boldly proclaims we can discriminate facts; and says that we should not accept a father stabbing a mother, simply because several years later the child went to an Ivy-league school.  There could be evidence (from a quasi-Freudian perspective say) that the stabbing was related to the child’s academic success; however, in all likelihood it was insignificant or was even detrimental to good traits or events in the child’s life which could have been consequential for more-or-less achievement regarding or not regarding Princeton.  In other words, change only one fact, say the child’s constitution or the mother’s mental state after the stabbing, or his place of custody after the stabbing, or simply a seemingly inconsequential action that the stabbing caused, and you could have a child that commits suicide due-to severe psychological pain rather than achieves academically. 
We can never know for sure, just as we can never be sure about anything, but that does not mean we should accept a radical philosophical skepticism and reject the possibility of knowing (though there is worthy debate over what some skeptics mean by “knowing” and whether or not some are simply saying we can never know anything with one hundred percent certainty – which is of course true) what facts lead to others, and therefore, knowing what general facts produce happiness in the brain and which produce suffering, what conditions should be promoted as to create a system of reliable relations as to create the greatest good for the greatest number.  Rather than accept the collective suffering of the world as either a “necessary evil” or even a good as Nietzsche and the Christian does.

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